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District Judge: Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter
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OPINION OF THE COURT

FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Alphonse Howard (“Howard”) appeals the District
Court’s determination that he was a career offender under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. He argues that the District Court erred in
relying on uncertified documents in determining that his two
previous drug convictions were felonies. We conclude that the
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District Court was correct in referring to uncertified documents
to establish prior convictions for sentencing purposes.
Accordingly, the District Court’s judgment will be affirmed.
I.
On March 15, 2006, law enforcement officials executed
a search warrant on 5511 Haverford Avenue in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. This residence, which was located within 1,000
feet of a school, was used by Howard to grow marijuana.
Howard was arrested and subsequently pleaded guilty to:
(1) manufacturing, and possession with intent to distribute, a
mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D);
and (2) manufacturing, and possession with intent to distribute,
a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of
marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 860(a).
On September 8, 2008, at Howard’s sentencing hearing,
he objected to the conclusion of the Pre-Sentence Report that he
was a career offender. He also argued that the government had
impermissibly introduced uncertified documents as proof of
prior drug convictions. These prior convictions, if established
as felonies, would classify Howard as a career offender under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and would enhance his offense level from 13
to 32.
Howard had previously been convicted on two separate
occasions in Philadelphia County for possession with intent to
distribute a controlled substance. He was sentenced to nine
3

months’ probation for his March 7, 2000 conviction and one
year of probation for his September 22, 2000 conviction. At the
sentencing hearing in this case, the government offered certified
copies of these convictions to establish that Howard was a
career offender for sentencing purposes. The certified copy of
the September 22, 2000 conviction, however, did not indicate
whether Howard had pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor for
possession of a controlled substance or a felony for conspiracy
involving a controlled substance. The government subsequently
conceded that the certified copy of conviction was ambiguous
as to the exact offense to which Howard pleaded guilty, but
argued that the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County
Criminal Docket (“M.C. Docket”) relating to Howard’s
September 22, 2000 case reflected that he had pleaded guilty to
a felony. The M.C. Docket was not a certified document. The
District Court granted the government’s request to continue the
sentencing hearing in order for the government to determine
whether the transcripts from the September 22, 2000 guilty plea
were available.
On December 3, 2008, the District Court re-convened the
sentencing hearing. The government stated that the transcripts
from the September 22, 2000 guilty plea were unavailable.
Notwithstanding that unavailability, the District Court relied on
the incomplete certified record of conviction and the uncertified
M.C. Docket entries to conclude that Howard’s September 22,
2000 guilty plea had indeed been for a felony, and thus that the
career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 was
appropriate. Howard was then sentenced to a prison term of 148
months. This timely appeal followed.
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II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal
matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The
question of what documents a district court may rely on to
determine the nature of a prior conviction and the scope of a
district court’s authority to make factual findings are questions
of law, Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005), which
we review de novo, United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 179
(3d Cir. 2002).
III.
Howard argues that the evidence presented by the
government at sentencing was insufficient to establish that he
was a career offender within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.1
Howard does not deny that he has two previous drug
convictions. Instead he challenges the evidence the District
1

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 provides that a defendant is a career
offender for sentencing purposes if
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old
at the time the defendant committed the instant
offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of
conviction is a felony that is either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3)
the defendant has at least two prior felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense.
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Court relied on in making the determination that his
September 22, 2000 conviction was a felony. Specifically, he
argues that the Court improperly relied on the incomplete
certified conviction and the uncertified M.C. Docket in
determinating his career offender status. Howard argues on
appeal that a court must rely only on certified documents as
evidence of prior convictions. We disagree.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in sentencing
proceedings. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3). Instead, evidence
presented at sentencing must have a “‘sufficient indicia of
reliability to support its probable accuracy.’” United States v.
Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting U.S.S.G.
§ 6A1.3(a)). Further, the fact of prior convictions is not an
element of a crime and need not be found by a jury. See
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244 (1998);
United States v. Ordaz, 398 F.3d 236, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2005).
The government bears the burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, prior convictions and career
offender status. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330
(1999); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986).
This Court has never established a per se rule that certified
copies of a conviction must be offered by the government before
a judge may determine a defendant’s career offender status
within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. See United States v.
Watkins, 54 F.3d 163, 168 (3d Cir. 1995).
In Watkins, the defendant argued “for a per se rule that
certified copies of the judgments of conviction are required in
every case before a sentencing court may determine that the
defendant’s prior convictions are for ‘violent felonies’” under
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the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Id. We specifically
declined to adopt an “inflexible” per se rule. Id. Instead, we
held that the district court did not err in relying on a presentence
report to “ascertain with certainty the statutes of conviction
. . . .” Id. See also United States v. Chavaria-Angel, 323 F.3d
1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining to establish a per se rule
requiring the use of certified records). We concluded in Watkins
that the district court properly determined from the presentence
report the defendant’s criminal history for purposes of
sentencing under the ACCA.
The Eleventh Circuit was faced with a similar question
in United States v. Acosta, 287 F.3d 1034 (11th Cir. 2002). The
defendant in Acosta argued that “because the record of his prior
adjudication [was] sealed, the government did not meet its
burden” of establishing his prior conviction for sentence
enhancement purposes because the government could not
produce a certified copy of his adjudication. Id. at 1038-39.
The government, however, presented an identical, uncertified
copy of the prior adjudication. The Eleventh Circuit did not
require the government to offer a certified document. Rather,
that court concluded that the uncertified copy of the defendant’s
prior adjudication was sufficient to satisfy the government’s
burden. Id. at 1039; see also United States v. Potter, 895 F.2d
1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 1990) (declining to “foreclose the
possibility that a defendant’s conviction . . . might be established
by some other form of clearly reliable evidence”).
In satisfying its evidentiary burden to prove career
offender status, the government may rely on certified copies of
convictions. However, a court may also confirm a defendant’s
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previous convictions by relying on the terms of the plea
agreement, the charging document, the transcript of colloquy
between judge and defendant, or other comparable judicial
records of sufficient reliability. See Shepard v. United States,
544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (holding that inquiry under the ACCA to
determine statutory elements of prior conviction is limited to
judicial records and may not include documents that simply state
facts, such as police reports). Addressing this issue, other
circuits assess whether the documents submitted have “sufficient
indicia of reliability to support their probable accuracy such that
the documents can be used as evidence of [a defendant’s] prior
conviction.” United States v. Neri-Hernandez, 504 F.3d 587,
591 (5th Cir. 2007); accord United States v. Felix, 561 F.3d
1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Zuniga-Chavez, 464
F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006).
In determining that Howard’s September 22, 2000
conviction was a felony, the District Court in this case relied on
an incomplete certified conviction record and M.C. Docket
entries, both of which are “records of the convicting court.”2
Shepard, 554 U.S. at 23. The M.C. Docket stated that Howard
was found guilty of “CSA-PWID-Conspiracy” and cites to
“35[Pa. C.S.A]§780-113§§A30,” which provides that possession
of marijuana with the intent to deliver is punishable in
Pennsylvania by a term of imprisonment not to exceed five
years. From this language the District Court concluded that

2

The M.C. Docket entry provided the District Court with
evidence of the specific statute under which Howard was
charged.
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Howard’s September 22, 2000 conviction qualified as a felony
for purposes of career offender status.
These docket entries are the type of judicial records that
are permissible for sentencing courts to use to establish past
convictions for sentencing purposes. The fact that the certified
conviction was incomplete and ambiguous as to the level of
Howard’s offense did not prohibit the District Court from
looking to other reliable judicial records to establish the type of
crime for which he was convicted.3
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s judgment.
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We do note, however, that the government’s ability to
rely on various documents from the judicial record to establish
past criminal convictions does not lighten its burden of proving
the prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence.
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